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Abstract
In this paper I revisit the issue of real income smoothing in the setting used by
Lambert (1984). I demonstrate that the particular e¤ect identied in his paper is ac-
tually an error: under his assumptions there is no input driven equilibrium income
smoothing of the type he suggests. There are, however, several other drivers of equi-
librium behavior ignored in that paper. In this paper I identify those and for the
particular model structure show that when all e¤ects are considered together there is
little support for the suggestion that second-best earnings generally is being smoothed
through the equilibrium behavior
1 INTRODUCTION
One of the earliest formal results in the Accounting Literature on (real) equilibrium earn-
ings management is that of income smoothing provided by Lambert (1984). In a multi-period
setting where the optimal rst-best strategy is to implement the same expected earnings
(i.e., action) in every sub-period, the deviation in equilibrium behavior under the opti-
mal second-best multi-period contract is not just a matter of lowering the e¤ort level as in
the similar one-period model variant, but also a matter of conditionality: in the second-
best, future actions, in this class of models, generally depend on past earnings realizations.
Lambert (1984) aimed to provide if not a general proof then a strong suggestion that such
interdependencies would likely lead to less volatile earnings as low actions would follow high
outcomes (and vice versa) and thus sub-period earnings would be mean-reverting, thereby
depressing the aggregate volatility of earnings.
The fact that the result forwarded by Lambert (1984) has survived and been a key refer-
ence for over more than three decades may be attributable to the seemingly straightforward
idea(s) and the intuition behind this result. Specically, when a manager learns that things
are on course to be better than initially expected, and thus that his total expected compen-
sation and utility exceed his initial expectations, this manager may start to value leisure
more relative to additional future compensation. Consequently, he may therefore choose
to pull back a bit on future e¤ort, causing the above-mentioned mean reversion. Because
this does make some intuitive sense, the presence of negative auto-correlation in second-best
earnings remains not only generally accepted as valid from a formal theoretical perspective,
but also continues to be frequently cited by, in particular, empirical papers investigating
issues related to managerial incentives for managing earnings.
It should be noted that Lambert (1984) is careful to point out that negative serial correla-
tion between realized outcomes and future e¤orts leads to smoother earnings (in expectation)
only if earnings is dened as the aggregate output of several periods (two in his case). This
particular denition is not a focus of this paper, nor is it something I address directly.
Yet, while Lambert (1984) makes no attempt to extend the correlation result to alternate
preference representations, he does argue that real (and perhaps also accounting) income-
smoothing is a natural if not general property of the second-best to the point where the
behavior should be considered empirically relevant. The results and insights provided in this
paper make clear that this line of thinking is neither complete nor correct.
While my analysis (coincidentally) does expose the error(s) contained in Lambert (1984),
the overall purpose here is to give a more detailed understanding of all earnings-related prop-
erties that can reasonably be predicted by a second-best agency model of the specic type
explored by Lambert (1983 & 1984). In doing so, I make several points that should signi-
cantly change the status-quo thinking on this issue. As the starting point, I rst establish
that the proof of the Proposition in Lambert (1984) is incorrect for a number of reasons.
Perhaps most signicantly, Lambert (1984) implicitly over-constrains the problem in such a
way that one of the key e¤ects that potentially does lead to an equilibrium relation between
past outcomes and future e¤orts, is disallowed from the set of feasible solutions and is there-
fore absent from his analysis.1 This particular e¤ect, which I refer to as the intertemporal
incentive e¤ectin this paper, consists of inducing outcome contingent variations in future
(costly) workload to reduce the costly variations in future pay needed to incentivize current
e¤orts.2
To establish smoothingas part of second-best equilibrium behavior, Lamberts (1984)
proof instead relies on wealth e¤ects argued to result from memory in the optimal con-
tract. However, for this particular class of multi-period full-commitment models, the cost
of providing incentives in any given sub-period is actually independent of updates to the
agents expected utility during the contracting horizon if (and only if) the agent has a power
utility function where the power is one half. Therefore, as I also show, absent the above-
mentioned intertemporal incentive e¤ect, the optimal second period action for the Lambert
1This problem actually originates in Lambert (1983). See equation (9) on p. 445.
2As I show, partially rewarding (penalizing) the agent for good (bad) outcomes using reduced (increased)
future workload is always optimal in this type of model.
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(1984) preference specication, is actually independent of prior outcomes even if the second
periods compensation is not.
Because the particular model formulation used in Lambert (1984) actually represents the
case in which wealth-e¤ect driven real earnings management does not take place, it also
provides the cleanest setting for characterizing the real source of equilibrium demand for
outcome contingent e¤ort choice in this class of models: lowering the cost of implementing
prior periodsactions, i.e., the intertemporal incentive e¤ect. Specically, the cost of having
to work harder/less hard in the future represents a penalty/reward to the agent that provides
current incentive just as getting a smaller/bigger bonus in the future does. As I show,
splitting current incentives between variations in future compensation and variation in future
(costly) work-loads is always e¢ cient regardless of the specics of the principals and the
agents respective utility functions.3
While the intertemporal incentive e¤ect is one-directional in the sense that, on aver-
age, second period e¤ort is lower for positive rst-period output-surprises than for negative
output-surprises and thus, again on average, favors of the behavior suggested by Lambert
(1984), the relation between current actions and past results due to the intertemporal incen-
tive e¤ect is generally non-monotonic unlike the wealth driven e¤ect proposed by Lambert
(1984). Moreover, the equilibrium relation between current actions and past results is deter-
mined jointly by both the wealth and the intertemporal incentive e¤ect.4 Absent the latter,
wealth-e¤ects drive the relation between past outcomes and present e¤orts, but there is no
particular natural prediction here. For agents with utility functions for which aversion to
risk, properly dened, decreases in wealth, the basic incentive is to make equilibrium e¤ort
an increasing function of past outcomes whereas the opposite is obviously the case when risk
aversion is increasing in past outcomes. On top of that, this is conditional on the princi-
3This is true within the class of models with time additive preferences where the agents cost of e¤ort is
denominated in utiles.
4It is also important to note that unlike the e¤ect proposed by Lambert (1984), the equilibrium rela-
tion between rst-period outcome and second-period e¤ort is generally not monotone and thus not easily
interpreted as smoothing behavior.
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pal being risk neutral. With a risk-averse principal, the equilibrium implications of wealth
e¤ects, while clearly central here, become even more intractable.
Lastly, regardless of the (net) equilibrium relation between current actions and past out-
comes, equilibrium actions in this type of model are in general a function of time: expected
second-best e¤ort is declining period-by-period and expected income is therefore also declin-
ing over time. This general e¤ect of moral hazard on the time series properties of earnins is
also missing from Lambert (1984) who instead suggests that if actions are not allowed to be
outcome dependent, they would actually be constant over time. To the contrary, I show that
the time-dependent decline in expected earnings is robust to the specication of the agents
preferences. More importantly, it is generally at odds with standard denitions of, motives
for, or causes of income smoothing even in cases where the agents preferences are such that
the behavior suggested by Lambert (1984) actually is part of the equilibrium.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the model and
the notation used here are laid out. In section 3 the model is solved and the structure of
the solution is compared with that provided by Lambert (1983 & 1984). Section 4 then
identies the unrelated and previously ignored features of the model that do make the time-
series behavior of the second-best deviate from that of the rst-best. Robustness of the
drivers of second-best time series properties of earnings to some central model specications
is explored in section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are contained in section 6.
2 MODEL
For simplicity and for ease of comparison with Lambert (1984), in this paper I will
concentrate on a simple two period version of the model introduced in Lambert (1983).
Also in the interest of familiarity and comparability, I mainly adapt the notation of Lambert
(1984). Accordingly, a risk-neutral principal, who values his end of horizon aggregate residual
by the linear function g (y) = y; contracts with a risk- and e¤ort-averse agent for T = 2 (sub-
4
) periods. The objective of doing so is for the agent to favorably impact the period t 2 f1; 2g
cash-ow probability distribution f (xtjat) ; where xt 2 X is the realized (and immediately
observed) cash-ow for period t; and at 2 A  R is the e¤ort committed by the agent at
the start of period t. The contract species the compensation paid to the agent at the end
of each period t 2 f1; 2g as a function of everything observed up to that point in time.
Let  !x t denote the vector of realized cash ows up to and including period t: The agents
period t compensation then is denoted as st (
 !x t) :The agent is assumed to be risk-averse and
have time additive preferences for consumption of the form u
 fstg2t=1 =P2t=1 u (st ( !x t)) :
Similarly, his (convexly increasing) cost of all e¤orts exerted at the start of each sub-period
t are time additive as well and thus takes the form v

fatgTt=1

=
PT
t=1 v (at (
 !x t 1)) ; where
 !x 0 = ;:
Denote by
Gt (st; at) 
Z
[xt   st ( !x t)] f (xt; at (xt 1)) dxt (1)
and
Ht (st; at) 
Z
u (st (
 !x t)) f (xt; at (xt 1)) dxt   v (at (xt)) (2)
the principals and agents respective expected period t utilities at the start of period t
calculated, in case of period 2, after x1 has been realized.5 Also let the principals total
expected (net) utility as of the time of contracting be denoted by
G (s;a)  G1 (s1; a1) + EG2 (s2; a2)
=
Z
[x1   s1 ( !x 1)] f (x1; a1) dx1
+
Z Z
[x2   s2 ( !x 2)] f (x2; a2 (x1)) dx2f (x1; a1) dx1;
and similarly let the agents total expected (net) utility as of the time of contracting be
5Note that (2) implies that the agents utility is additively separable in utility of consumption and dis-
utility from the cost of e¤ort.
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denoted by
H (s;a)  H1 (s1; a1) + EH2 (s2;a2)
=
Z
u (s1 (
 !x 1)) f (x1; a1) dx1   v (a1)
+
Z Z
[u (s2 (
 !x 2)) f (x2; a2 (x1)) dx2   v (a2 (x1))] f (x1; a1) dx1:
As in Lambert (1984) both parties are assumed able to fully commit to the contract
agreed prior to the start of period one (hereafter with a slight abuse of notation denoted
period t = 0):6 At the time of contracting the agent has outside opportunities worth  utiles
should he not accept the long-run contract o¤ered by the principal. As is always assumed
in this particular class of models, the principal has free access to any needed liquidity. The
agent, in contrast, has no personal means of intertemporal consumption transfers here, and,
thus, can neither borrow nor save privately: all income physically received (i.e., paid which
is di¤erent here from what is actually earned) by the agent by the close of period t therefore
goes towards creating utility for that period and that period alone. For simplicity, I ignore
any discounting as the implications are largely trivial here. Finally, as in Lambert (1983 &
1984), the rst-order approach is assumed to be valid with the standard implications for the
di¤erentiability e.t.c. of f (xtjat) and v () with respect to at:
6After rst identifying the relevant e¤ects under the same conditions as those used in Lambert (1984), I
address the implications of relaxing the agents ability to fully commit in section 5.
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3 BENCHMARK
Given that the rst-order approach is assumed to be valid here, the principals problem
can be summarized as
max
s;a
G (s;a) (PP)
s:t: H (s;a)   (IRP)
Ha1 (s;a) = 0 (IC1P)
Ha2(x1) (s;a) = 0 for each x1; (IC2P)
where the super-scripts a1 and a2(x1) as usual denote the derivatives with respect to these
choice variables. Let  be the multiplier on the agents participation- or IR-constraint, 1
be the multiplier on the rst period incentive compatibility constraint, and 2 (x1) be the
multiplier on the second period IC-constraint corresponding to the realized value of rst
period output. As is known from the initial literature detailing the solution to this class of
models based on the rst-order approach,7 the optimal period 1 and 2 contracts for this case
of a risk-neutral principal must satisfy the rst order conditions
1
u0 (s1 (x1))
= + 1
fa (x1ja1)
f (x1ja1) ; (3)
1
u0 (s2 (
 !x 2)) = 2 (x1) + 2 (x1)
fa (x2ja2 (x1))
f (x2jat (x1)) ; (4)
where
2 (x1)  + 1
fa (x1ja1)
f (x1ja1)
is non-decreasing in x1 by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition (MLRC hereafter)
and the fact that each t > 0; which in this risk-neutral principal case follows directly from
Jewitts (1988) Lemma 1.
7See Lambert (1983).
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Similarly, the optimal e¤ort strategy from the perspective of the principal must satisfy
the rst-order conditions
Ga1 (s; a) + Ha1 (s; a) + 1H
a1a1 (s; a) = 0 (5)
and
Ga2(x1) (s; a) + Ha2(x1) (s; a) + 1H
a1a2(x1) (s; a) + 2(x1)H
a2(x1)a2(x1) (s; a) = 0 (6)
The terms multiplying  in both (5) and (6) are here both equal to zero and the last term
in both (5) and (6) is negative due the assumed validity of the rst-order approach central
to the formulation of the original problem. In contrast, (A4) in Lambert (1984) (and eq. (9)
in Lambert (1983)), which is supposed to be the same rst-order condition as (6) above, in
the notation used here reads
Ga2(x1) (s2; a2) + H
a2(x1) (s; a) + 2(x1)H
a2(x1)a2(x1) (s2; a2) = 0; (A4)
where the term multiplying  is again zero due to the assumed validity of the rst-order
approach.8
Several di¤erences are noteworthy, here. First, the term multiplied by 1 in (6) which
is absent from (A4), based on the argument that the rst-order approach guarantees such
derivatives to be zero. Ha1a2(x1) (s;a) is, however, easily recognized as a cross-partial and
cannot therefore safely be assumed to be zero simply based on the rst derivative being zero.
Indeed, to the contrary, as I will show in the next section, this cross-partial is a critical link
between past performance and future actions without which there actually is no such link
to be found in the particular setting analyzed by Lambert (1984).
A separate other perhaps more subtle di¤erence between (6) and (A4) is that the rst
terms in his expression corresponds to Ga2(x1) (s2; a2) rather than to Ga2(x1) (s;a) as used
in equation (6) above. While seemingly benign, as I will also show in the next section this
8The term is therefore not included in eq. (9) and the original version of (A4) in Lambert (1983) and
Lambert (1984) respectively.
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discrepancy is what drives the Proposition in Lambert (1984) and accordingly is a key error
in his proof. The principal solves his problem at time zero as reected by Ga2(x1) (s;a) in
(6) : Using instead Ga2(x1) (s2; a2) in (A4) implies that he solves the second period problem
at the start of the second period which he clearly does not.
Finally, it can be noted that in contrast to Lambert (1983; 1984), the second period IC-
constraints, and thus the last term in (6) here, are also written from a time zero perspective.
Surely, the agent chooses the second period action to implement after x1 is observed. But
from a game-theoretic perspective, the agent actually chooses his strategy at the time he
accepts the contract and does not deviate from plan later. While writing it the way I do
is formally the correct way, in this case it is then primarily a matter of presentation that
arguably only makes identifying and interpreting the multipliers on the second period IC-
constraints more straight-forward.9
4 EQUILIBRIUM CAUSES OF SERIAL CORRELA-
TION
The purpose of this section is to dissect the di¤erence between the rst- and second-best
behavior in such a way as to isolate and identify the nature of the three unique causes of
second-best serial correlation present in this model formulation: wealth-e¤ects, intertemporal
incentive e¤ects and horizon e¤ects. Because wealth e¤ects are the focal point of Lambert
(1984), in the next sub-section I start by establishing that for the model as specied, the
particular case of a risk neutral principal and an agent with square-root preferences is actually
the special case where wealth e¤ects are not present in the model. This, in turn, helps provide
the simplicity that allows me to cleanly identify the other two e¤ects that are always present
here.
9Formally, my approach identies 2 (x2) directly, while following the Lambert (1983) approach, the
identication is a two stage process. See the rst paragraph of his page 446.
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4.1 Wealth E¤ects
To identify the link between past outcomes and future actions, it is useful, as well as
instructive, to consider a slightly di¤erent and simpler problem than the one detailed in
the previous section. Specically, let f1; 1; 2 (x1) ; a1; a2 (x1)g denote the values of the
parameters that solve the principals problem as captured by (PP ) and consider then an
alternate situation where the principal does not face a rst period moral hazard problem
but where the optimal rst period action as well as the structure and nature of the second
period problem remain intact. Specically, assume:
Assumption: Suppose i) a1 is observable, ii) fa (x1; a1) = 0 for a1 > a1; and iii) that
s1 (x1) and s2 (x1; x2) are exogenously restricted to take the form of (3) and (4) respectively
with 1 = 

1:
This alternate problem, (AP ) ; then consists of choosing fk; 2 (x1) ; w (x2) ; a1; a2 (x1)g to
max
Z 
x1   s1 (x1) +
Z
(x2   s2 (x1; x2)) f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2

f(x1; a1)dx1 (AP)
s:t:
Z 
u (s1 (x1)) +
Z
u (s2 (x1; x2)) f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2   v (a2 (x1))

f(x1; a1)dx1
  v(a1) =  (IRA)Z Z
[u (s2 (x1; x2)) fa (x2; a2 (x1)) dx2   v0 (a2 (x1))] f (x1; a1) dx1 = 0 8a2 (x1)
(IC2A)
1
u0 (s1 (x1))
= k + 1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
(CO1A)
1
u0 (s2 (x1; x2))
= k + 1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 2 (x1)w (x2) (CO2A)
Let  and 2 (x1) represent the Lagrange multipliers on (IRA) and the (IC2A) constraints
respectively. It is then straight-forward to verify that here k =  and 2 (x1)w (x2) =
2 (x1) fa (x2; a2(x1)) =f (x2; a2(x1)) so that the structure of the (constrained) optimal con-
tracts here is the same as for (PP).
The purpose of the alternate problem represented by (AP ) is that it provides a means to
address the following question: if the second period contract is irrelevant for the rst period
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solution but the agents second period compensation does depend on the rst periods realized
outcome (by at here, but none the less), what then would be the relation between second
period second best action and rst period realized outcome? Let
nea1;ea2 (x1) ; e; e2 (x1)o
denote the parameter values that solves the alternate problem represented by (AP ) : The
answer then is:
Proposition 1 For u (y) = 2
p
y; dea2 (x1) =dx1 = 0:
Proof.
Clearly, the solution to the alternate problem has a1 = a1: Then, ea2 (x1) is the solution
to the Principals second-period alternate problem:
max
a2(x1)
Z
x1
Z
x2
x2 

+ 1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 2 (x1)
fa(x2; a2(x1))
f(x2; a2(x1))
2
f (x2; a2 (x1)) dx2f(x1; a

1)dx1
where
 = ( + v (a1) + E [v (ea2 (x1))]) =4
and
2 (x1) = v
0 (a2 (x1)) =2
Z
fa(x2; a2(x1))
2
f(x2; a2(x1))
dx2; 8x1
can be obtained directly from the IR-constraint and the second period incentive compati-
bility constraint rewritten using the properties of the agents assumed utility function here.
For simplicity dene L1  fa(x1;a

1)
f(x1;a1)
and L2  fa(x2;a2(x1))f(x2;a2(x1)) : Substituting the expressions for 
and 2 (x1) back into the principals objective function yieldsZ
x1
Z
x2
x2   [ (x1)]2 + 2 (x1)L2 (a2(x1)) + [L2 (a2(x1))]2 f (x2; a2 (x1)) dx2f(x1; a1)dx1
=  2   (1)2 2L1 +
Z
x1
 
Ex2jx1 [x2ja2(x1)]  (2 (x1))2 2L2

f(x1; a

1)dx1
=   [( + v (a1) + E [v (ea2 (x1))]) =4]2   (1)2 2L1
+
Z
x1

Ex2jx1 [x2ja2(x1)]  [v0 (a2 (x1))]2 =42L2

f(x1; a

1)dx1:
Then, di¤erentiating w.r.t. a2 (x1), the rst-order conditions become
E 0x2jx1 [x2ja2(x1)]  v0 (a2 (x1)) [( + v (a1) + E 0 [v (ea2 (x1))]) =8]
  d
h
[v0 (a2 (x1))]
2
=42L2
i
=da2 (x1) = 0; 8x1:
Thus, because neither the production- nor the cost-function depend directly on x1, a2 does
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not either because the a2 that satises the rst-order condition is the same regardless of the
realization of x1.
The point here is that absent rst period incentive considerations, even if the second-
period compensation paid to the agent does depend on the rst periods outcome, the equi-
librium second-period action does not when the principal is risk neutral and the agent has
square-root preferences over consumption levels. This is signicant for a number of reasons.
First note that the rst-order condition for the second period action choice of the alternate
program (AP ) if following the approach of Lambert (1983, 1984) is
Z
(x2   s2 (x1; x2)) fa (x2; a2(x1)) dx2
+2 (x1)
Z
u (s2 (x1; x2)) faa (x2; a2(x1)) dx2   v00 (a2 (x1))

= 0 (7)
and thus identical to (A4): Because the structure of the second period contract used here is
the same as well, the implied relation between 2 (x1) and a2(x1) is identical. Accordingly,
all the steps of the proof o¤ered by Lambert (1984) can be replicated here and, if done, yield
the same (false) conclusion that dea2 (x1) =dx1 < 0:
The key problem with relying on (7) for the purpose of that proof is that by dropping
the expectation across the rst period output realizations, as made explicit in the Lemma
imbedded in the proof in Lambert (1984) ; the problem de-facto becomes one of solving a
series of one period problems with interim IR-constraints: That is, again, not the problem
the principal is solving in this setting. He is solving a problem at time zero with just one ex-
ante IR-constraint. The technical implication of this is that the derivative of the Lagrangian
w.r.t. a2(x1) must be evaluated at time zero. The appropriate condition to use therefore is
Ga2(x1) (s; a) + 2(x1)H
a2(x1)a2(x1) (s; a) = 0
Using this condition instead of his (A4) as the basis for the proof in Lambert (1984) yields
the correct result that is the one reported as Proposition 1 above.
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Before proceeding it may also be useful to point out one of the key logical inconsistencies.
Lambert (1984) argues, based on his expression (A7) which is the same as the expression for
2 (x1) in the proof of Proposition 1 above, that 2 (x1) only depends on x1 insofar a2 (x1)
does. This is, of course, also a not so subtle hint that a2 (x1) here does not depend on
x1 unless 2 (x1) does. Unlike the chicken and the egg, there actually is a dened logical
sequence to the present problem. Recall that 2 (x1) is xed at t = 0 as the part of
the optimal contract that provides output-based variation in compensation and thus e¤ort-
incentives for the agent. The agent implements a2 (x1) subsequently as the agents optimal
response to the optimal contract. This implies conceptually that if 2 (x1) does not depend
directly on x1, neither will a2 (x1) which is exactly what is established by Proposition 1:
In more technical terms, then, when taking the partial derivative of (7) with respect to x1
the derivative of 2 (x1) with respect to x1 cannot be taken to be zero as part of a proof to
establish that the derivative of a2 (x1) with respect to x1 is not.
The absence of wealth e¤ects established here contrast also with, for example, Matsumura
(1988) and Ramakrishnan (1988) that both attribute negative serial correlation between
outcomes and future actions of the Lambert (1984) type to wealth e¤ects stemming from
compensation derived from rst period e¤ort.10 This is based on the same misunderstanding
that the cost of e¤ort must be compensated in the state it is exerted in this two period
set-up underlying the proof in Lambert (1984). If that was the case, surely higher agent
wealth coming into the second period would make it more costly to compensate e¤ort in
that period. But it is not the case at all. As a quick inspection of the IR-constraint reveals,
second period e¤ort is compensated in expectation only and as such, there are no wealth
e¤ects in the second period other than those that a¤ect directly the aversion to risk.11
The bottom line is that in the case of the square root preference representation there are
10Matsumura (1988) makes her claim in a setting where the agents preferences are dened in terms
of aggregate consumption and are thus not time additive. In the last period of a two period model this
distinction is obviously entirely irrelevant, however.
11It should be noted that the proof of Proposition 3 in Ramakrishnan is mechanically correct. It is the
attribution of the e¤ect identied to changes of wealth that is incorrect. The result is due to the interim
incentive e¤ect that has been missed by the literature and that I detail in the next section.
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no wealth e¤ects, and if one considers the optimal period 2 action entirely independent of
its impact on the incentives for the period 1 action, which is the purpose of the alternate
program, (AP ), there is no demand for outcome contingent e¤ort-variations. This is of
course not true in general. As long as the principal remains risk-neutral, the nature of
the wealth-e¤ects depend directly on the functional form of h0 () :12 For example, staying
within the power class, it is easily veried that for  2 (1=2; 1) ; h0 (u) is concave while
the opposite is just as easily veried to be the case for  2 (0; 1=2) : In the former case
the opposite behavior from that proposed by Lambert (1984) is the e¤ect of responding to
past realizations while the e¤ect is as suggested in the latter case. But the direction of the
wealth e¤ect does not even have to be the same across wealth-levels: for the case where
u (y) =  e2y1=2 ; for example, where the agent exhibits decreasing relative risk-aversion, h0 (u)
is convex for relatively low values of u but concave for relatively high ones.
4.2 Intertemporal Incentive E¤ects
While the second-period wealth-e¤ects generated by the rst period risk-sharing can go
either way, optimal second period actions always depend on the nature of the rst period
incentive problem. In particular, it turns out, the more severe the rst period moral hazard
problem is, the more valuable it is to condition the second period action on realized rst
period outcome. As demonstrated above, absent a rst-period moral hazard problem the
optimal second-period action here is invariant to exogenously mandated wealth permutations
generated by rst period outcomes when the agent has a square root utility function. When
the very same wealth permutation arises endogenously due to a rst-period moral hazard
problem, however, otherwise ine¢ cient second-period e¤ort variations emerge in equilibrium
as a means of lowering the cost of providing rst-period incentives
To see this, consider again the original problem represented by (PP ). First note that for
the square root case, by (3) and (4) here
12For a nice discussion of the relation between the properties of the agents preferences and wealth e¤ects,
see Ramakrishnan (1988), Section 2.
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u (s1 (x1)) =
Z
u (s2 (x1; x2)) f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2:
This follows because under the optimal contract, the agents (second-period) equilibrium
response is such that the expected likelihood ratio is always zero. Also note, that if we
simply were to exogenously restrict attention to sharing rules that satisfy (3) and (4) and
solve only for the optimal actions (along with the corresponding multiplier values) we would
identify the same (second-best) solution as obtains from (PP ) : Following this approach,
(IC1P ) can be re-expressed simply as
Z
f2u (s1 (x1))  v (a2 (x1))g fa(x1; a1)dx1   v0(a1) = 0:
The signicance of this is, of course, that variations in second period actions that are dic-
tated by rst period outcomes impact the agents rst period incentives through variations in
second-period costs, v (a2 (x1)) ; and are a direct substitute for second-period compensation-
variations tied to rst period outcome realizations. In particular, using this version of
(IC1P ) ; the derivatives of the the Lagrangian with respect to rst- and second-period e¤ort
become
Z 
x1   s1 (x1) +
Z
(x2   s2 (x1; x2)) f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2

fa(x1; a1)dx1;
+ 1
Z
f2u (s1 (x1))  v (a2 (x1))g faa(x1; a1)dx1   v00(a1)

= 0; (8)
and Z Z
(x2   s2 (x1; x2)) fa (x2; a2(x1)) dx2f(x1; a1)dx1
 1
Z
v0 (a2 (x1)) fa(x1; a1)dx1
+2 (x1)
Z Z
u (s2 (x1; x2)) faa (x2; a2(x1)) dx2   v00 (a2 (x1))

f(x1; a1)dx1 = 0
for each x1: (9)
The main point here is that the second period can only be viewed in isolation when there
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is no rst period incentive problem, that is when (IC1P ) does not bind. If it is binding
the choice of second period action as a function of rst-period outcome plays a direct role
in resolving the rst-period incentive problem and (IC1P ) thus will not be ignored by the
principal when choosing a2(x1) as suggested by (7) :
The second line of (9) above is, as discusse above, missing from equation (9) in Lambert
(1983) and from (A4) in Lambert (1984) based on the argument that it is the validity of the
rst-order approach as reected by (IC2P ) makes this term equal to zero. This represents
a fundamental misunderstanding of the vastly di¤erent choice problems facing the agent
and the principal, however. (IC1P ) and (IC2P ) represent the agents choice problem after
the principal has chosen the structure of the contract. The principals choice problem, in
contrast, is to craft a deal that both attracts and appropriately incentivizes the agent. To
see this clearly, consider the principals problem of choosing an incentive compatible a1: In
its most general form (IC1P ) can here be written as:
Ha1 (s;a) =
@E [u (s1 (x1))]
@a1
+
@E [u (s2 (x1; x2))]
@a1
  v0 (a1)  @E [c (a2 (x1))]
@a1
= 0:(10)
Because the optimal contracts always must satisfy (3) and (4) ; u () = 2p implies,
as is well known, that the agents utility from consumption under the optimal contract is
additively separable in x1 and x2 as well: Accordingly, in the agents rst period choice
problem,
@E [u (s2 (x1; x2))]
@a1
is independent of the principals choice of which f (x2; a2(x1)) to implement. The agent is
choosing a1 knowing that his second period strategy, a2(x1); will be the optimal response to
the contract, which has the optimal strategy, a2(x1) as chosen by the principal, embedded
in it through the second-period likelihood ratio. The last term in the second-period contract
(denominated in utiles) is therefor always zero in expectation at the time the agent chooses
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a1 and thus has no bearing on his expected second period utility as a function of his choice
of a1. But this, of course, also implies that in the principals choice problem,
@
h
@E[u(s2(x1;x2))]
@a1
i
@a2 (x1)
=
@
R R
u (s2 (x1; x2)) f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2fa(x1; a1)dx1
@a2 (x1)
= 0 8x1;
while obviously @
R
c (a2 (x1)) fa(x1; a1)dx1=@a2 (x1) is not.
To crisply identify the e¤ect of incentivizing rst period action via variations in second
period actions, using (IRP ) ; (IC1P ) and (IC2P ) along with (3) and (4) ; for this square
root representation I can easily calculate
 = (v(a1) + E [v (a2 (x1))] + U) =4; (11)
1 =
v0(a1) +
R
v (a2 (x1)) fa(x1; a1)dx1
4
R fa(x1;a1)
f(x1;a1)
2
f(x1; a1)dx1
(12)
and
2 (x1) =
v0 (a2(x1))
2
R fa(x2;a2(x1))
f(x2;a2(x1))
2
f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2
: (13)
Again, it is immediately clear from (13) that there is no second-period demand for outcome-
contingent variations in the second-period action here. The shadow price of the second period
IC-constraint, 2 (x1), is the same for any given level of second period e¤ort regardless of
the realization of x1: Accordingly, there are no wealth e¤ects present here that change the
risk-premium and thus the cost of second period incentives.
The sole reason second-period e¤ort may depend on rst-period outcome is trough the
impact of a2 (x1) on 1 via the integral in the numerator of (12) : It is also immediately
obvious from (12) that if a2 (x1) does depend on x1; E [a

2 (x1)] is necessarily smaller for
positive than for negative values of fa(x1; a1), because this lowers the cost of incentivizing
rst-period e¤ort, as represented by 1; by making the integral in the numerator negative:
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Lowering the cost of rst period incentives by introducing outcome contingent variations in
second period work-load comes, of course, at the expense of second period second-best e¢ -
ciency, so the optimality of conditioning second period e¤ort on rst period output depends
on the net of these e¤ects. The next proposition establishes that it is always e¢ cient to in-
troduce some such costly variation in second period e¤ort to lower the cost of the rst period
IC-constraint. Specically, let X+1 = fx1jfa(x1; a1)  0g and X 1 = fx1jfa(x1; a1) < 0g: For
the model as specied we then have
Proposition 2 For u (y) = 2
p
y; EX+1 [a2 (x1)] < EX
 
1
[a2 (x1)] :
Proof.
Start by solving for the optimal a1 and a2 when the latter exogenously is restricted not
to depend on x1: The multipliers on the IC-constraints then both take the form
et = v0 (at) + (2  t) R v (a2) fa(x1; a1)dx1
(4=t)
R fa(xt;at)
f(xt;at)
2
f (xt; at) dxt
; (14)
where the integral in the numerator (of e1) is zero given that a2 here is restricted to be
independent of x2. Consider then to add  of a variation, 2 (x1) =

2
 
X+1

; 2
 
X+1
	
; toe2 that is strictly positive for X  and strictly negative for X+ with 2  X+1  f  X+1 ja1 +
2
 
X 1

f
 
X 1 ja1

= 0:
With this we have
v0(a2
  
X+1

) =
 e2 + 2  X+1 D2
v0(a2
  
X 1

) =
 e2 + 2  X 1 D2;
where D2 is the denominator (14) :
With this
@E [v0 (a2)]
@

=0
=
 
2
 
X+1

f
 
X+1 ja1

+ 2
 
X 1

f
 
X 1 ja1

D2 = 0:
Further, letting the monotone relation between v0 (at) and v (at) be represented by the func-
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tion c () such that v (at) = c (v0 (at)) : Then,
@E [v (a2)]
@

=0
=
f
 
X+1 ja1
 @c   e2 + 2  X+1 D2
@

=0
+
@c
  e2 + 2  X 1 D2
@

=0
f
 
X 1 ja1

=
 
2
 
X+1

f
 
X+1 ja1

+ 2
 
X 1

f
 
X 1 ja1

c0 (e2)D2 = 0:
Finally, let the inverse of the agents cost function be denoted by w () such that at =
w (v (at)), then
@E [a2]
@

=0
=
f
 
X+1 ja1
 @w  c   e2 + 2  X+1 D2
@

=0
+
@w
 
c
  e2 + 2  X 1 D2
@

=0
f
 
X 1 ja1

=
 
2
 
X+1

f
 
X+1 ja1

+ 2
 
X 1

f
 
X 1 ja1

w0 (c (e2)) c0 (e2)D2 = 0:
Accordingly, the e¤ect of adding a small variation, 2 (x1), to the best second period contract
that is restricted not to depend on x1 is zero. In contrast,
@
R
v (a2) fa(x1; a1)dx1
@

=0
=
fa
 
X+1 ja1
 @c   e2 + 2  X+1 D2
@

=0
+
@c
  e2 + 2  X 1 D2
@

=0
fa
 
X 1 ja1

=
 
2
 
X+1

fa
 
X+1 ja1

+ 2
 
X 1

fa
 
X 1 ja1

c0 (e2)D2 < 0;
thus decreasing the shadow price of the rst period IC-constraint, e2: There is therefore
strict value to introduce a strictly positive amount of such a variation in the agents contract
because the reduction in the cost of providing rst period incentives outweighs the cost of
making second period e¤ort outcome dependent and thus non-constant.
Finally note that for any x1 2 X 1 there can be no value to setting a2 (x1) < a2 (bx1) ifbx1 2 X+1 because doing so introduces a costly variation in second-period e¤ort while at the
same time increasing the cost of incentivizing rst period e¤ort.
The e¤ect documented here seems quite intuitive in the additively separable preference
specication: variations in future compensation and variations in future workload are sub-
stitutes when it comes to providing incentives. From a theoretical perspective, the risk
premium associated with providing rst period incentives using risky second period compen-
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sation can be reduced by substituting some of that compensation risk with some rewards
in form of leisure. With a concave utility function over consumption and a convex cost
function for e¤ort, the optimal solution always entails splitting incentive provision between
future monetary compensation and future leisure. It also ts well with rewards in terms of
time o¤ and paid vacation being tied to performance as well as with notions such as resting
on your laurels.
It is important to note that while the intertemporal incentive e¤ect appears consistent
with the Proposition in Lambert (1984), it is actually fundamentally di¤erent as it is deter-
mined by the integral in the numerator of (12) that is missing from Lambert (1983, 84). In
contrast, the Proposition in Lambert (1984) is entirely driven by mistakenly over-constraining
the problem with interim IR-constraints resulting in wealth e¤ects that, as established in
the prior section, are not part of the solution in the square root case. The signicance of this
is that second-period e¤ort in Lambert (1984) is predicted to be monotone in the rst period
likelihood ratio, which is monotone in rst period output by the MLRC.13 The integral in
the numerator of (12) ; in contrast, depends only on the numerator of the likelihood ratio
which is not generally monotone in x1:
To get some feel for the di¤erence between the behavior predicted by the intertemporal
incentive e¤ect and that suggested by the analysis in Lambert (1984), consider the Gamma
distribution
f (x; a) =
1
a
e (x=a)  (x=a)
k 1
(k   1)!
of which the Exponential distribution used in the example in Lambert (1984) is the special
case where (the positive integer) k = 1. For this distribution, the likelihood ratio is given by
fa (x; a)
f (x; a)
=
x  ka
a2
and is thus monotone (linear) in x for any admissible (k; a) : As discussed above, however,
13See the second-to-last sentence of the proof in Lambert (1984) :
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the intertemporal incentive e¤ect is not driven by fa (x; a) =f (x; a) ; but rather by fa (x; a)
alone.
Figure 1 maps out f (x; a) and fa (x; a) for the Gamma distribution for k = 1 and k = 2
to illustrate the inherent non-monotonicity of equilibrium second period e¤ort as a function
of rst period outcome.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
The Exponential fa (x; a) is monotone over X 1 but clearly not over X
+
1 : Moreover, the rela-
tively small values of fa (x; a) over X+1 imply that second period e¤ort will be less responsive
to rst period output over X+1 than over X
 
1 . For k = 2 (or greater) the Gamma distribution
takes on a more normal shape with the mode greater than the lower bound on x. This
increase in symmetry is mirrored in the shape of fa (x; a) which is now clearly non-monotonic
over both X+1 and X
 
1 . Note, however, that the relatively larger values here of fa (x; a) over
X+1 imply that second period e¤ort will be more responsive to rst period output over X
+
1
than over X 1 . Thus while for any k the induced equilibrium behavior on average leads to
smoother income in the Lambert (1984) sense, the induced behavior does not resemble one
the principal would induce if the objective actually was to produce smoother income.
4.3 Horizon E¤ects
The third and nal second-best force that shapes the time-series properties of earnings is
time itself, or, remaining time to be precise. As should be obvious from (4) and the discussion
throughout, the time-additive preference structure makes it optimal for the principal to
spread current periods incentive risk over remaining periods. Intuitively, then, the more
periods left, the closer the solution is to the rst-best while the fewer, the closer it is to
the standard one-period second-best. As per the argument in the previous section, certainly
the last period is worse (in expectation) than the one-period second-best due to the use of
otherwise ine¢ cient outcome contingent variations in e¤ort to provide incentives in prior
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periods. The e¤ect of this is that (expected) e¤ort decreases over time at an increasing rate.
Although Lambert (1983) does show that commitment is valuable here in the sense that the
more periods that are covered by a contract the better, the link to the time series properties
of output is missing in Lambert (1984) as well.
To highlight the e¤ect of the passage of time on earnings smoothness I will again use as
a benchmark the case where second period action cannot depend on rst period outcome
but only be a function of time. Eliminating the term in the numerator of (12) that is the
source of second period outcome-dependence and substituting into the objective function,
the principals constrained problem can here then be expressed as choosing a1 and a2 to
maximize
E [x1] + E [x2]  
2
2
 
Z
21
2

fa(x1; a1)
f(x1; a1)
2
f(x1; a1)dx1
 
(Z 
2 (x1)
2
2 Z 
fa(x2; a2(x1))
f(x2; a2(x1))
2
f (x2; a2(x1)) dx2
)
f(x1; a1)dx1
or
E [x1] + E [x2]  
2
2
  1
2
R fa(x1;a1)
f(x1;a1)
2
f(x1; a1)dx1
  1R fa(x2;a2)
f(x2;a2)
2
f (x2; a2) dx2
(15)
Let a1 and a

2 denote the solution to (15) : Since everything is symmetric in this formulation
except for the 2in the denominator of the term representing the cost of rst-period incen-
tives, it is clear that a1 > a

2: This in turn implies that expected output is also decreasing
over time here.
To establish that expected second-best e¤ort is indeed decreasing over time, then, consider
the di¤erence between this solution and the solution to the unrestricted problem, a1 and
a2(x1). Again, following the result of the prior section, second-period e¤ort-randomization
lowers the cost of rst-period incentives but increases the (expected) marginal cost of second
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period e¤ort. As a result, we have a1 > a

1 > a

2 > E [a

2(x1)] : That this relation generalizes
to other utility functions than u (y) = 2
p
y is established by the nal proposition.
Proposition 3 a1 > E [a

2(x1)] :
Proof.
The result follows almost directly from the proceeding discussion. To sketch a more
formal proof, consider two di¤erent problems: i) the principal contracts with the agent for
two periods but only facing a moral hazard problem in the rst period and ii) the principal
contracts with the agent for two periods but facing only a moral hazard problem in the
second period. Because the solution to problem i) spreads the rst period incentive related
risk risk over the two remaining periods while the solution to problem ii) can only allocate
risk to the second period, the marginal cost to the principal of eliciting rst-period e¤ort in
problem i) is strictly less than that of eliciting second-period e¤ort in problem ii).
Next consider the full two period problem. First note that the wealth and intertemporal
incentive e¤ects always (weakly) increase the average marginal cost of eliciting second period
e¤ort. Since the optimal contract always transfers rst period risk to the second period and
since that is always (weakly) ine¢ cient from the perspective of the second period, the result
follows.
While expected income thus is going to be declining over time, the model arguably also
predicts that income volatility will be changing too. The e¤ect that the shrinking remaining
horizon has on income volatility is not guaranteed to be in one or the other direction, however.
Clearly for the class of production functions identied by Jewitt (1988) for which the rst-
order approach is valid and of which the Gamma specication is a member, volatility is
mechanically linked to expected output and is therefore also guaranteed to fall over time.
For less natural specications supportive of the rst-order approach such as those identied
by LiCalzi and Spaeter (2003), all that can be said is that volatility will change over time
but it is conceivable that the direction of the change itself will be changing (once) over time.
For the weighing of two distributionsspecication as per Hart and Holmström (1987)
the e¤ect on volatility depends on the relative volatility of the two distributions in question,
as well as their correlation. Only in very special cases, where the production-function is
of the e¤ort-plus-noise type and variance thus is independent of e¤ort is the volatility
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guaranteed to be constant over time even as the expected income declines.14 None of this
appears generally consistent with some meaningful notion of income smoothing behavior,
however.
5 ROBUSTNESS CONSIDERATIONS
Before concluding it seems worthwhile to provide some sense of the robustness of the 3
key drivers of equilibrium time-series behavior in the basic multi-period agency model to
the specic assumptions made. A natural benchmark for this is one where neither of the
3 e¤ects are present, namely the multiplicatively separable constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) preference representation where the agent is assumed to care only about aggregate
consumption:
H (s;a)   e r

s( !x 2) 
X
t
v(at)

: (16)
The lack of opportunities for intertemporal risk sharing for this specication obviously elimi-
nate the horizon e¤ect. CARA combined with multiplicative separability which importantly
is equivalent to denominating the cost of e¤ort in monetary units rather than in utiles as
in the additively separable specication used in the proceeding analysis eliminates wealth
e¤ects as well. Finally, denominating the cost of e¤ort in monetary units eliminates the
intertemporal incentive e¤ect: substituting variation in v (a2) for variation in s (
 !x 2) for a
given level of rst period incentive is always strictly costly because of the convexity of the
cost function. This does not depend on CARA but is true whenever e¤ort cost is deducted
directly from the compensation before the overall utility is assessed.
Consider then instead modifying this specication so that
H (s;a)   e rs( !x 2)  
X
t
v (at) : (17)
14Generally e¤ort-plus-noiseproduction functions are not compatible with the rst-order approach. A
possible specialized exception is the Laplace-Normal hybrid distribution type of Hemmer (2013) due to its
likelihood ratio being bounded.
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The continued absence of intertemporal consumption smoothing opportunities ensure that
the horizon e¤ect is still not present. The other two e¤ects are present now, however. First,
the risk needed in the contract to implement a particular action is now strictly increasing in
wealth because of the concave transformation of s ( !x 2) in the agents decision problem not
present under (16) : Accordingly, because of CARA the wealth e¤ect for this specication
would be consistent with Lambert (1984). This is not the case for the square root repre-
sentation because its declining ARA exactly compensates for the increasing risk needed to
implement a given action for higher levels of risk. Second, Proposition 2 applies here due
to the concave transformation of s ( !x 2) as well: it is always optimal to substitute some
variation in v (a2) for risk in s (
 !x 2) used to incentivize rst period e¤ort when the utility
function is additively separable as in (17).
Lastly, the role of full commitment of the agent to a long run contract for (in partic-
ular) the intertemporal incentive e¤ect warrants some attention. From a purely technical
perspective the principal can always write the contract such that the agent never wants to
break it because the act of doing so is veriable. From a practical and more descriptive
perspective, however, the clauses needed to ensure this may not be enforceable based on
existing law. The natural question then is whether interim IR-constraints imposed when
the agent requires some minimum second-period expected utility at the start of the second
period to remain with the agency, would diminish the demand for using future e¤ort cost to
incentivize current e¤ort? As it turns out, the role of this approach to providing incentives
instead arguably becomes more pronounced.
To eliminate confounding wealth e¤ects I rely again on the square root specication
here. Under full commitment, spreading the rst period incentive risk evenly across the two
periods and make the expected utility the same across the two periods is always optimal
here. This is regardless of the nature of the second period incentive problem. Consider then
the other extreme where neither party can credible commit and where the agent requires an
expected utility at the start of the second period of =2 to remain with the agency. In this
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case the two periods become independent with a1 = a2 and the same expected utility for
the agent in each period. The loss of all commitment eliminates the ability to split the rst
period incentive risk over both periods and in doing so also eliminate the ability to provide
intertemporal incentives via the second periods choice of e¤ort.
Denote the contracts pair that solves this (no commitment) problem
p
s1 (x1) = 

1 + 

1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)p
s2 (x2) = 

2 + 

2
fa(x2; a

2)
f(x2; a2)
;
where t = (=2 + v (at)) =2; and 

1 = 

2 > 0: Then, suppose now for a moment that the
same is true also when (only) the principal can commit. Consider then modifying these
period-by-period contracts as follows
q
s1 (x1) = 

1 + (1  )1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 1L

1q
s2 (x2) = 

2 + 

1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 2
fa(x2; a

2)
f(x2; a2)
  1L1
where L1 is the lowest possible realization of
fa(x1;a1)
f(x1;a1)
. This contract implements the same
action pair while maintaining both the ex-ante and the second period IR-constraints.
The expected compensation to be paid by the principal then is
Z
x1
"
1 + (1  )1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 1L

1
2
+
Z
x2

2 + 

1
fa(x1; a

1)
f(x1; a1)
+ 2
fa(x2; a

2)
f(x2; a2)
  1L1
2#
f(x1; a

1)dx1f(x2; a

2)dx2:
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or after integration
(1)
2 + 21

1L

1 + (1  )2 (1)2 2L1 + (1L1)2
+(2)
2   222L2 + 2 (1)2 2L1 + (2)2 2L2 + (1L1)2
The marginal e¤ect of increasing  on expected compensation evaluated at  = 0; however,
can then be found as 2 (1)2 2L1 < 0: Thus it is optimal to shift some of the incentive-related
risk to the second-period and thereby lower the cost of providing period one incentives also
when the agent cannot commit to stay for the second period.15 Accordingly, with the cost of
e¤ort denominated in utiles in the additively separable preference specication, Proposition
2 applies so that variations in second period work-load will continue to optimally depend on
rst-period output as long as the principal remains able to commit.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper I explore the various ways the properties of earnings may be a¤ected by
agency problems in the early formulation of the multi-period model rst proposed and ana-
lyzed by Lambert (1983 & 1984) : The enduring key insight in respect to earnings properties
from his analysis is that second-best income (at least for the particular preference structure
employed by Lambert (1984)) is managedin equilibrium in a way that results in smoother
earnings, appropriately dened. I demonstrate that this result is false: under the assump-
tions of his model, explicit and implicit, there is no equilibrium relation between past income
and future actions. Because the particular setting is actually a knife-edge case, it is clear
that when such relations exist in this formulation, they are entirely due to wealth-e¤ects in
the agents utility function. Such e¤ects, however, can go either way: they just as plausibly
lead to smoother as to less smooth income regardless of how one chooses to dene income
smoothness.
15Lambert (1983) makes a similar point in his section 5.
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I then proceed to use this benchmark case of no relationto identify other, generally
ignored, implications for the time-series behavior of income predicted by this type of model.
First, I show that when e¤ort is not implicitly (and sub-optimally) required to be compen-
sated in the period/state where it is exerted, output-contingent variation in future e¤ort is
optimally used to incentivize current e¤ort. This intertemporal incentive e¤ect,which is
separate from the wealth e¤ect does push the solution in the direction of making future e¤ort
inversely correlated with current output. The relation is not monotonic, however, making
it harder to interpret the induced equilibrium behavior as income smoothing. Second, I
show expected equilibrium e¤ort and, thus, income is going to be declining over time. This
horizon e¤ect is separate from the other two e¤ects and is not output contingent. Since
e¤ort generally also impacts the volatility of income, however, this e¤ect is hard to reconcile
with standard notions of smoothing behavior as well.
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FIGURES
Figure 1. f (x:a) and fa (x; a) for the Gamma Distribution with k = 1 (the two panels to
the left) and k = 2 (the two panels to the right).
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